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exeCutive SummAry
The problem of supplying households and industry with natural gas became a sensitive 
issue on the entire European continent.  Lack of agreement between Russia and Ukraine, the 
blockade of natural gas supply in the middle of the winter of 2005 and 2006, the struggle 
for  taking control over the gas transit lines situated on the territory of Ukraine, which 
neighbors Moldova, shuttered the minds in the last years and generated some dubious 
reactions over the existing state of relations in the former soviet region, which have been 
established after the „more or least pleasant divorce” of its former republics and provoking 
tensions with the Central and Western European states. These are invariable tensions which 
appeared as a result of a deliberate Russian policy, which aims at regaining hegemonic 
control in this are by means of political and economic leverages. Kiev or Warsaw, similar 
to the countries (Baltic States, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia) which were directly 
affected from Russian geo-economic blackmail attempted to offset Russian actions which 
these countries consider inadequate. Moreover, undertaking the control over the national 
gas distribution and transit systems leaves these countries vulnerable to energetic security 
issues and represents a grave factor which is being used in various political and military 
manipulations of Kremlin. 
The tariff policies or the blockade of gas supply creates numerous “time bombs” when 
following and improving the democratic course of the countries. As a result countries see 
themselves in a dangerous dependence which impacts their course of democratization. 
In 2006 EU expressed its discontent for the potential risk which resulted from the Energy 
Carte, which Russian Federation refuses to sign. Ukrainian parliament ratified a set of laws 
which prohibit the transfer of the transition system to tertiary parties. This is an attempt 
to protect the country from recent Russian political and economic expansion. Armenia, 
Georgia along with Poland and Baltic States are looking for solutions to fence off Russian 
energetic intentions, which might clench the economies of these countries. 
In this regard, what are the actions and the strategy Republic of Moldova is following? What 
has been done in the past and what will be done to protect the business environment, 
consumers from geo-economic repressions , bribe takers and artificially inflated tariffs? 
How should we define in a better way our energetic security, and what should be done to 
avoid issuing governmental decision without any clear content, but start staking actions 
in the public interest, in the interest of the populations of Republic of Moldova. It is as 
well important to realize to what point we have come to. It is well known that country’s 
administration agreed several years ago to hand over gradually the control over the gas 
pipe transit routes and distribution networks to the Russian monopolist Gazprom, without 
receiving anything in exchange which could motivate this transaction. 
The story behind this illegal transaction and its consequences remain to our opinion an 
open topic for discussion for the civic society, public authorities and other institutions from 
Republic of Moldova who should bring it sooner back-up for public awareness. Only in this 
way public authorities, civic society and business representatives can express their loyalty 
for the political regime and constitution of Republic of Moldova. It is a way for the public to 
recognize the relative utility of the governing institutions.
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PoLitiCAL And eConomiC Context1. 
At the end of August 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the declaration of 
independence of the soviet republics, there was a need to adjust the framework of the 
external political and economic relations that governed this space to new realities. The 
new independent states were recognized by the international community. As a premise of 
the post-soviet democracy the newly emerging elite was making efforts to define exactly 
the content of the independence and motivate the objective for transition to a market 
functional economy and a state of law. The big majority of this elite did not have clear idea 
over how to achieve this objective. 
In the economic sense these countries had to detach a considerable part of the state 
patrimony, which was in possession of some enterprises directly managed by the central 
authorities, ministries or specialized agencies. Therefore one of the solutions for re-
adjusting the economic relations to the new political context was to reorganize among 
the newly independent states the patrimony which belonged to the old soviet rule in the 
frame of setting up new economic relations. The reorganization process starting off in 1991, 
however due to an enormous work load related to the acquired or transmitted property, 
decision were made after years of negotiations and repeated appraisals. 
In this context the specifics of Republic of Moldova is the 1992 violent military conflict which 
took place between loyal to Chisinau constitutional regime forces and the separatists from 
south-eastern part of the country (Transnistria). The separatists were strongly backed by 
the Russian political rule and military force. The massive implication right after Republic of 
Moldova declared its independence of the special forces (KGB) and the Division 14, which 
was transferred in the same period under direct jurisdiction of the Russian Military Forces 
determined a military intervention and aggression of the latter ones against the sovereignty 
and independence of Republic of Moldova. The conflict generated a profound crisis both 
in the relations of political elite from Chisinau with local authorities in Tiraspol and in the 
bilateral moldo-russian relations.
This crisis could not bypass the transfer process of the economic patrimony. Moreover local 
authorities from Tiraspol were becoming more determined for separating from RM using 
violent means. This also implied taking control over property objects which according 
to the agreement reached between Russian and Republic of Moldova under no means 
belonged to the separatist authorities. Transnistrians did not have any legal right to take 
the control over neither the union enterprise from the south-east of Moldova or the Maiac 
retransmission station. The same principle applies in regards to electric lines and transition 
of natural gas from the left bank of Dnester. 
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the ProPerty rightS over the nAturAL gAS 2. 
SuPPLy SyStem
After Soviet Union collapsed, Moldova acquired an entire natural gas transportation/
transition and distribution network situated on its territory. This heritage can be separated 
conventionally into 2 distinct components:: 
Interstate gas transportation network1. . There are 4 gas pipe routes which operate at a 
different pressure level and cross the territory of Republic of Moldova (see table 1). 
Gas is being transported through the first line (ADCB) to the underground deposit 
at Bogorodceani and the other 3 ensure gas transportation to the neighboring 
Balcan countries. Gas is being propelled by means of a system of pumping stations 
(compression) which generate the necessary pressure. As it is indicated in the table, one 
of these stations is located in Drochia. Other 4 stations in Tiraspol generate the pressure 
for transporting gas to Izmail using the other 3 lines.
Gas Distribution network, 2. comprises approximately 7000 km of gas lines which reach 
consumers throughout the entire country. 
Table 1.Central Gas routes on the territory of Republic of Moldova
Central Gas Pipe Route
The Length on the 
territory of RM 
(km)
Including 
Transnistria 
(km)
Location of the 
pumping station
1.  Ananiev-Drochia-Cernăuţi-
Bogorodceani (ADCB) 199,8 15,0 Drochia
2.  Ananiev-Tiraspol-Izmail (ATI) 92,1 18,8 Tiraspol
3.  Şebelevka-Doneţk-Krivoi Rog-
Razdelnoe-Izmail (ŞDKRI) 124,58 23,1 Tiraspol
4.  Razdelnoe-Izmail (RI) 126,46 24,3 Tiraspol
totAL: 542,94 81,2
The evolution of property over this heritage can be divided into 3 time periods:
period (1992- august 1995), the entire gas transportation and distribution heritage I. 
remains an exclusive property of Republic of Moldova. However separatist authorities 
reserve the administrative control over some part of it (see Chapter I);
period (august 1995 – october 1998), the Gas Pipe Line Routes are included in the II. 
statutory capital of the joint moldo-russian enterprise -- a Closed Jointed Stock 
Company „Gazsnabtranzit”. “Gazprom” possessed 50% plus one privileged share (voting 
right) from this enterprise. The local gas distribution network remained a property of 
Republic of Moldova and remained partially under control of the Tiraspol regime. The 
2 companies which are operating this network are „Moldovagaz” and „Tiraspoltransgaz” 
respectively.
period (october 1998 – present). The entire gas transportation and distribution network III. 
becomes part of the statutory capital of the moldo-russian JSC “Moldovagaz”. “Gazprom” 
holds 50% + 1 privileged share from “Moldovagaz”.
In the upcoming sections of this chapter from this report we will analyze the framework 
that all the property transformations took place in; its effects over gas consumption and 
national interests of Republic of Moldova regardless of the party that was in power.
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The heritage of the gas pipe routes from the left 2.1. 
bank of the Dnester
Prior to proceeding with the analysis of the system use by the Republic of Moldova 
authorities for administering the natural gas transportation and distribution patrimony, it 
should be mentioned that 
as a consequence of the situation that resulted from the military clash between the −	
military forces of Republic of Moldova and the separatist ones driven by the marionette 
government of the Russian Federation in Tiraspol
after signing the agreement for ceasing fire in the summer of 1992 and outlining the −	
further controlled territory, a big part of the patrimony of Republic of Moldova including 
the gas transport lines remains in under control of the Transnistrian administration.(see 
Table 1).
You will therefore notice that there is a branch of the central gas line which spans through 
the Northern region of the country (see Annex 1) and other 3 gas lines which lie in the 
southern part of the country. During the soviet time the 4 gas lines were part of the balance 
sheet of the „Prikarpattransgaz” enterprise. Every of the 4 lines is crossing the separatist 
territory. The separatist authorities from Tiraspol were administering this patrimony by 
mans of the municipal enterprise called „Tiraspoltransgaz”. Until present moment there has 
been no legal evidence provided which would confirm the transfer of this heritage from 
„Prikarpattransgaz” into possession of  „Tiraspoltransgaz”. The value of the assets which 
“Tiraspoltransgaz” is currently possessing cannot be verified using the inventory act since 
the appraisal was done using the initial value of the assets which cannot be demonstrated 
by Transnistrian administration as well. At first sight this technical and legal aspect does 
not to be conveying any meaning simply because Tiraspol administration is managing 
these assets. However these However the oversight of this issue resulted later in causing 
a damage to the Republic of Moldova citizen interests’  when establishing in 1995 the JV 
„Gazsnabtranzit” in 1995 and when establishing JSC „Moldovagaz” in 1998. This topic will be 
analyzed in more details in sections 2.4. and 2.6.
 Sub estimating the value of the patrimony of 2.2. 
R.Moldova in 1993-1994
When the nationalization process of the USSR patrimony on the territory of Republic of 
Moldova was taking place the Department for Gas Line „Prikarpattransgaz” wrote off 
according to the act from February 12, 1993 a part of the ADCB gas line in favor of the 
State Department for Gasification from Republic of Moldova. This portion was assigned to 
“Gazoducte Magistrale” from Drochia. The total value of assets was estimated at 1,13 billion 
rubles of the former USSR, including amortization (according to the data from 1 January 
1993). This value is almost 36,8% from the total value of the gas transportation lines on the 
territory of Republic of Moldova, not including the value of the 3 gas lines which transport 
gas to the Balkan states. However even this part of patrimony should have been included on 
1 April 1993 on „Moldovatransgaz” balance sheet (the enterprise which was administering 
this line at that point) at its transferred lei value.
On march 5th 1993, the Government of Republic of Moldova adopted the decision nr.118 
„Regarding reevaluating the fixed assets and adjusting the value calculation of the state 
patrimony for a further privatization,  taking into account the inflation level in 1992”. 
There is no legal 
document until 
present days 
which could en-
title Transnistria 
to holding a part 
of Moldova and 
their value was 
not verified...
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According to p.1 of this decision , the enterprises, institutions and organizations from 
Republic of Moldova regardless of form of property, were obliged to finish up the before 
15 may 1993, the indexation of the fixed assets according to the situation from January 
1 1993. These institutions had to finish before December 31st 1993 the reevaluation of 
the fixed assets according to the information resulted from inventory on October 1 1993. 
The Republican Enterprise for Central Gas Lines “Moldovatransgaz” had to abide to the 
stipulations of the decision which would bring as we estimate the value of assets of the 
ADCB gas line to circa 1,33 billion lei. Unfortunately this was not done.
In the following years aiming at accomplishing the State Privatization Program in Republic 
of Moldova, adopted by the parliament, on May 13th 1994 the central government adopted 
the Decision nr.287 „Regulation and acceleration of the State patrimony privatization 
process”. This act stipulates that, at the moment of transformation of state  enterprises 
into JSCs , the value of patrimonial contributions will be recalculated by multiplying this 
value taken in the last financial report of the enterprise (which already had to be adjusted 
according to the Act nr. 118, see previous paragraph) taken by indexation coefficients and 
will be adjusted according to the cumulative inflation size in 1994. Providing that gas branch 
administration especially the „Moldovatransgaz” administration executed the stipulations 
of this Act, by the end of IV th quarter (1st October) 1994 the value of this patrimony would 
have reached 15,98 billion lei. Unfortunately even this Act was not put into practice. It 
appears that the „Moldovatransgaz” administration refuses to obey the decision taken by 
the government of Republic of Moldova. The situation wouldn’t be so grave if:  (1) the value 
of the patrimony would’ve been recalculated later on, following the stipulated actions 
in the previous decisions/acts or (2) this patrimony would have remained state property 
before indexation.
However in reality after what the administration of „Moldovatransgaz”, under no legal 
circumstances reduced the value of the Gas Line patrimony which was part of its property, 
follows on with a proposal to alienate this property. Taking into account that the only 
body entitled to alienate the state property was Ministry for Privatization and Public 
Administration, especially to a foreign economic agent, on September 20th 1994 the 
administration of „Moldovatransgaz” and branch representatives initiated on behalf of 
Republic of Moldova and agreement to establish a moldo-russian JV enterprise which 
assumed the responsibility to supply Republic of Moldova with natural gas and administer 
the gas transit on its territory. „Moldovatransgaz” had „Tiraspoltransgaz” and „Gazprom” as 
partners in this affair. In fact these are enterprises which are not even registered in Republic 
of Moldova.
Moreover the illegal Agreement which was signed on September 20th 1994 stipulates that 
„Gazprom” will possess slightly less that 51% of shares in the statutory capital of the newly 
create enterprise. The capital was formed on account of Moldova’s debts for gas supplied 
by „Gazprom”.
It is necessary at this point to emphasize some details:
This agreement could have been denounced at any moment as being illegal at least 1. 
based on the fact that people who signed it on behalf of Republic of Moldova did not 
have the delegated authority to sign legal documents which were enormously harming 
the national interests of Republic of Moldova;
by renouncing the 50% of gas lines property to a single proprietor, exceptionally 2. 
monopoly which maintains control over gas supply should be further seen as losing 
leverage in conducting price negotiations with the monopoly both for consumption 
and gas transit. 
The value of 
Moldovan assets 
was diminished 
illegally by over 
$ 3,5 billion 
comparatively to 
the value result-
ed from the legal 
stipulations ...
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The realities existing at that moment and even today reveal the picture when it is impossible 
to create a real market for gas transportation. The reason for this is the absence of alternatives 
for delivering gas to the Balkan states, while the gas transit line can function only within a 
integral system. At the same time the property over every of its segment are in the hands 
of economic agents or even countries. As a result we are seeing a paradox when supply 
of gas to Balkans is controlled by a small number monopolies because regardless of the 
line distance that monopolies administer   (as it is in the case with separatist authorities 
from Transnistria) they hold monopoly rights on the functioning of the entire gas system. 
In order to drop light on the matter of this issue it is necessary to outline that the gas that is 
being transported through this system is the property of the only monopolist: “Gazprom”. 
In these ambiguous juridical conditions and complex interdependences, the only method 
to preserve the negotiation capacity with the Russian monopolist regarding the price is to 
maintain at least the decision power over the price for transiting the gas through Moldova. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the initiative expressed in the above mentioned Agreements 
to give up “Gazprom” 50% state property from the gas pipe routes of Republic of Moldova 
and implicitly the power to set-up unilaterally the price for transit was a harmful decision for 
the citizens of Republic of Moldova. In the following chapters we will elucidate how this was 
translated into practice.
The idea itself to pay back the debt of Republic of Moldova to “Gazprom” by giving-up 3. 
a significant share of state gas pipeline patrimony is not any better or worse than any 
other decision for paying back these debts providing that Republic of Moldova preserves 
it negotiation capacity.(see above). De facto this means that Republic of Moldova sold 
its property at the price of its own debt. However as in the case of any transaction the 
price matters the most. According to the law the price of one single gas line route from 
the right bank of Dnester should have cost over $ 3,7 billion USD. This is the price which 
should have been offered by “Gazprom”. “Gazprom” could have also give its refusal for 
conducting a similar transaction which would leave Moldova to pay its debts from the 
other sources (see chapter 2.3) as it has been done in following years.
Nevertheless there few people who could acknowledge the juridical logic and the arguments 
of this summary over the detriment of the above mentioned agreements which directly affect 
the economic interests of the country. On October 7 1994 the Government of Republic of 
Moldova adopted unilaterally the Act nr.749 which stipulates “Establishment of a moldo-
russian JV ”, which implies the creation of a working group which will be dealing with 
alienation of the state property by passing the Ministry of Privatization and State Property 
Administration.
This group was empowered to conduct together with representations from “gazprom” 
preparation works founding the new enterprise. The group was entitled to coordinate the 
methodology and recalculate the value of gas transportation assets on the territory of 
Republic of Moldova. This stipulation was contradicting the functioning legislation of our 
country, according to which there is only one existing method for reevaluating the assets 
which are to be assigned as patrimonial contributions: indexation method according using 
coefficients described in the Government Decision (nr.118 from 1993 and nr. 287 from 1994). 
Moreover: there are no legal documents which could prove the need for another reevaluation 
of this enterprise and its assets. 
There has been a commission created headed by director of  “Moldovatransgaz” who 
conducted the enterprise property evaluation using other principles than stipulated in the 
legislations of Republic of Moldova. The group used a methodology which was not published 
When Moldova 
agreed to al-
low “Gazprom” 
establish uni-
laterally the 
transit price has 
deprived the 
country’s budget 
and the citizens 
from hundreds 
of millions of 
lei...
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and being known by certain foreign experts who were acting as “Gazprom” was indicating. The 
result of this was including into calculation only a part of the property of the enterprise: ADCB 
Gas Line (in the Northern part of the Republic). Speaking about the remaining 3 gas lines 
which span 277 km across the territory of Moldova only on the right side of Dnester there has 
been not a single km taken into calculation. As a consequence of this calculation, the value of 
gas transportation system from the right side of Dnester was reduced to 343 mln lei, which is 
over 45 times less than the value calculation method stipulated in the legislation.
The experts from “IDIS Viitorul” based on the available data conducted an independent 
evaluation of the State Property. The methodology is based on the assumption that the gas 
pipe system should be viewed as a business. The reason for not estimating the gas line as 
assets is due to the lack of a real market for gas transportation pipelines. The system for gas 
transportation and distribution is at the natural monopoly stage. 
On the other hand, estimating the value of the gas line assets based on the construction costs 
is also irrelevant as in the case with compounding the cost for natural gas based on extraction 
costs or calculating the construction cost of an aqueduct which does not have access to 
water source anymore. In this context the value of the gas line assets should be viewed as a 
composition of:
their value as a natural gas transiting business through republic of moldova to a 1. 
third country; and
their value as a part of the natural gas distribution system and its sale in republic 2. 
of moldova.
The methodology applied by experts from IDIS for estimating the value of the gas line assets 
in Republic of Moldova was based on calculating future profits and calculating their present 
values. In other words we aimed at conducting a logical appraisal of the cumulative value in 
1994, expected returns from transit gas pipe exploitation. It has to be mentioned that data 
regarding the transit of natural gas through ADCB (located in the North of the country) are 
of little credibility indicating that in 1994-1999 there was only one registered case in 1995 for 
transporting gas using this line. The approximate value of gas is estimated at 10 million USD, 
which is a smaller transit price compared to the price charged for gas transition to Balkans. 
For this reason the 3,996 billion lei  value (including 2,997 billion lei afferent to the right 
side from Dnester) was obtained as a result of principles and calculations from Annex 2 and 
it will be taking as a reference point 
in this research, when referring only 
to the value of gas transit business 
to Balkans using the Ati, SdKri and 
ri gas routes.. This value does not 
include the ADCB pipe route (for the 
above mentioned reasons ) and does 
not refer to the value of all the other 4 
gas routes within the gas distribution 
system used for internal consumption 
in Republic of Moldova due to the 
difficulty of estimations.
Therefore the illegal Agreement 
which was signed on September 10th 
1994 and the Government Decision 
Act nr.749 created a favorable 
Diagram The Value of Central Gas Pipe Lines 1 comparatively to 
the price paid by “Gazprom”, mln $
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grounds for the Russian monopoly to purchase the 50% share of gas route assets at a price 
which is circa 9 times less than the real one (See Diagram 1). This action deprived the citizens 
of Republic of Moldova from a patrimony which was evaluated at circa 1,78 billion lei, or 
according to the exchange rate at  that time (4,27 lei for 1 USD dollar). It is over 415 million 
USD dollars, which is equivalent to $97 taken away from every citizen of the country from 
both sides of Dnester taken in conventional prices from 1994.
Artificial increase of debts of Republic of Moldova 2.3. 
to „Gazprom” in 1994
As it was mentioned in the previous section, according to the agreement which was signed 
on September 20th 1994 and The Government Decision Act nr. 749 from October 7 1994, 
“Gazprom” was entitled to 51% share from the statutory capital of the moldo-russian JV 
which had to be established. If Moldova would have decided to make a physical contribution 
to the statutory capital (gas lines) then Russian contribution according to the agreement 
would be compound „...from Moldova’s debt to the gas that was supplied to consumers in 
1993-1994...”. In this section we will examine in more details the situation with debts.
According to the verification act of the economic and financial relations between Republic 
of Moldova and  “Gazprom”, for January 1 1994, at the beginning of the year– this is when 
the illegal agreement was signed – Republic of Moldova’s debt to “Gazprom” for the natural 
gas which was supplied constitutes only 22,2 million US dollars, or 94 million Moldovan 
lei taking at the day exchange course, including 14,3 million US dollars (over 60 million 
lei) afferent debt to Transnistria. Nevertheless even with adding up the afferent debt of 
Transnistria this sum does not raise to 30% from the value which was 9 times reduced of a 
part of the gas line assets! In order to justify the 51% share “Gazprom” was targeting in the 
new JV, the value of these debts had to be at least greater than 343 million lei plus the gas 
line patrimony from the balance sheet of „Tiraspoltransgaz”, which also took part at this 
affair. However with the debt accumulation rhythm at that moment, years were needed 
to achieve the level that could be at least compared to the underestimated value of the 
“Moldovatransgaz” assets.
As a result in December 1993 “Gazprom” issued a new project for a contract in which gas 
delivering conditions for Republic of Moldova were roughly changed. According to the new 
project:
The price for natural gas supplied for internal consumption in Republic of Moldova •	
should increase from 38,5 to 80 US dollars per 1000 cubic meters, 
The price for transiting gas through the territory of Republic of Moldova was remaining •	
unchanged, in spite of increasing cost for gas transition and consumption;
The payment for gas should be done in advance, using weekly payments;•	
For each day of delay in payment there should be a 0,35% fine paid from the total •	
amount that is due;
In the situation of not paying for gas during 2 months “Gazprom” reserves the right to •	
cut off gas supply to Republic of Moldova.
In table 2 there is a comparative analysis of the stipulations from this agreement and other 
contracts for gas supply from “Gazprom”. Based on this we can conclude that the terms that 
were proposed to Republic of Moldova were much rougher on the country compared to the 
terms that were negotiated with other former soviet states. It is not known to what extent a 
similar analysis was conducted by those made further the decision on behalf of the central 
Republic of 
.Moldova made 
an 89% price 
discount for 
„Gazprom” 
when selling a 
part of the gas 
route... If simi-
lar conditions 
would be avail-
able for citizens 
then one would 
need half a year 
to purchase an 
apartment in 
Chisinau hav-
ing a salary of a 
teacher...
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authorities of Republic of Moldova, but this contract was signed without any transparency. 
The contact was immediately hidden from the public. As a result of a different politics 
towards Republic of Moldova, during one year(1994), the debt of Republic of Moldova for 
gas to “Gazprom” increased from 22,2 to 331,6 million US dollars, including penalties: over 
140 million US dollars. This enormous debt is a result of the following factors:
Table 2. “Gazprom” gas supply conditions to Moldova and other CIS states in 1994
Indicator R. Moldova Other CIS countries
The price for 1000 m3 of natural gas 80 $ 30-80 $
Ukraine - 80$ 1,316 $ 1,73 $ (Ucraina)
Transit price for 1000 m3 of natural gas per 100 
km 1,316 $ 1,73 $ (Ukraine)
Penalties for each day when paying off the cost 
of gas (% from the debt) 0,35
0,02 (standard, including for 
Moldova in 1995)
Terms of payment and Advance weekly payment Data not available
Existing agreements on gas ceasing gas supply Yes N
Unadjusted price for Gas transit•	 . As we have described before the gas exporting 
business by using the central gas routes is very specific, being dominated by natural 
monopolies at each stage. For this reason, in order to introduce a parity of total income 
distribution from sale of gas the transit price is being calculated in proportion to prices 
for gas. Therefore if the gas prices tend to increase the price for gas transiting goes up 
proportionally. This is a normal widely use practice which can be met for example in 
Ukraine. In reality the transit price has not been adjusted o the proportional increase 
of prices for gas which is a lost 93 million lei of income (22 million USD dollars at the 
exchange course of the day). It has to be mentioned that if the price for transition in 
Moldova would have been adjusted proportionally to the increase of price for supplied 
gas to Moldova its value would be significantly greater than in Ukraine. We do not know 
however where this different comes from.
The amount of penalties.•	  The penalties calculated for other countries for every day of 
delay in payment consisted 0,02-0,03%. It means that Moldova was imposed penalty 
which was 12-17 times greater than in other states. If we consider that the average 
penalty level for each day of delayed payment is 0,025%, then at the same gas price 
level the amount due would reduce from 140 to 10 million US dollars.
Terms of payment•	 . According to the available data the gas supply contracts with 
“Gazprom” and other countries presume delayed payments for up to 6 months. In this 
context, accepting by the former country governors the conditions for weekly advance 
payments appear to have no economic grounds, especially in  the situation when 
the country cosigned to exaggerated penalty payments for delays. Hence Republic 
of Moldova had to pay for gas on average 18,5 days earlier than the countries which 
were making monthly payments for gas that was consumed in the previous month. 
If all the above mentioned conditions are equitable, the penalties that are calculated 
for Republic of Moldova would have reduced from 140 to 9 million US dollars, which is 
approximately a 15 times fall-off. Hence every citizen had to pay additional 30 dollars 
(in one year!) which at that time was an equivalent for a monthly salary.
The Volume of transit gas in 1994•	 . According to the data for 1994 the transit volume of 
gas to Balkan states was 2 times less compared to the following years, which suspicious 
and requires an additional investigation. The reason for this was the essential decrease 
of income of Republic of Moldova from gas transition, respectively leaving a large debt 
balance feeding the penalty calculation. Moreover, according to the data provided by 
„Moldovagaz”, since 1994 until 1999 there was only one gas transit made via the ADCB 
route (north of Republic). The value of this transaction is $ 10 mln. In our opinion this 
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information has to be verified (at least using the consumption statistics from the Western 
Balkan natural gas beneficiary countries. The price for gas transit in this pipe route 
was smaller for transit to Balkans. Unfortunately this data as well as other information 
regarding the entire gas supply in Republic of Moldova is not made public. These 
reports should be reflecting high figures which are very important for the economy of 
Republic of Moldova.
Delay of payment to “Gazprom” even when money was available•	 . According to the 
information for 1994, from the total of 70 million US dollars that were to the Russian 
monopoly for the gas that was supplied , there were only 458 th. US dollars paid in 
monetary unit, which is equivalent to 1,86 million of lei at the average exchange course 
for that year, which represents only 0,19% from the value of imported gas from Russian 
Federation in that year. However the tariff at which it was sold to consumers was even 
higher (see Chapter 3). It is important to outline that “IDIS Viitorul” experts calculated 
a 10 million lei benchmark for all the money expenses for supply, transportation and 
distribution system maintenance. Together with the 2 million lei which were paid to 
Russia, this money would constitute approximately 1% from the total amount consumer 
was charged. It appears to be impossible for consumers to have paid that little for gas 
consumption in Moldova in 1994.
In terms of the •	 possibility for cutting off gas supply late payments or any other reason, 
we do not have information whether there have been similar clauses existed or not in 
the contract “Gazprom” signed with other countries. It is certain though that according 
to calculations the delays in payment for gas constituted on average 150 days, which is 
2,5 times more than the 2 month term stipulated in the contract. This clause has never 
been applied, which can be interpreted as it was more convenient for “Gazprom” to 
continue gas supplies and calculating penalties for entire sum that was being due. This 
position can be easily understood once that these sums being artificially increased at 
least 15 times were to be converted into real property over the gas line patrimony on 
the territory of Republic of Moldova. This “genial” strategy of capturing the property 
of Republic of Moldova will have grave consequences on the economy of Republic of 
Moldova, which we are going to be discussing further. 
To sum  up we can state that by accepting the conditions of the “Gazprom” contract in 1994 the 
total debt of Republic of Moldova to the Russian monopoly was increased by 150 million US 
dollars. This meant that each citizen from both sides of Dnester had to pay $35 (only during 
1994) which can be considered as a gift made to “Gazprom” by the administration which 
accepted to sign this contract and was well aware of the consequences which will occur 
a as a result of its enforcement. Moreover the Russian monopoly was invited to purchase 
on this money strategic property of Republic of Moldova with a 89% price discount (the 
prices was 9 times less than the market one). If such conditions were acceptable not only for 
“Gazprom” but also for other actors (local companies or even Moldovan citizens), then the 
$35 which were gifted to Russian gas company would be enough to conduct a successful 
privatization of some estate values.
Property reshuffling when constituting 2.4. 
„Gazsnabtranzit” in 1995
By ignoring the obvious disadvantages of the transaction which implied underestimating 
the asset value and artificially increasing the debt, on December 6 1994  the Parliament of 
Republic of Moldova adopted the Decision Act nr. 305 regarding „Government’s proposal 
for creating a moldo-russian JSC...” According to article 1 of this decision, it was agreed upon 
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government’s decision to pay off the debts by transmit ting part of “Moldovagaz” patrimony 
on “Gazprom” account. This entitles the Russian gas supplier to become a shareholder in the 
JSC. In this section we will examine in details this process.
First of all it has to be mentioned that in the previous sections we regarded Moldova as 
integral from the point of view of its patrimony, population. De facto at that moment the 
juridical and administrative situation was far from being homogeneous. One part of the 
population, a segment of national territory and significant shares of patrimony (including 
the system for supply with natural gas) were kept under control of the separatist authorities 
from Tiraspol. Russian gas monopoly was in a very advantageous position in this regard. 
This argument is supported by the fact that there were 3 parties which participated at 
establishing the above mentioned  JSC: “Gazprom”, with 50% + 1 privileged share obtaining 
the capital from the debt amount which was accumulated by Moldova (see section 2.3), 
“Moldovatransgaz” with 39% based on the underestimated value of the gas lines from the 
right bank of Dnester  (see section 2.2) and „Tiraspoltransgaz” with 11% property controlled 
by the self-proclaimed regime in Tiraspol. Below we will examine how these shares were 
calculated and how they should’ve been divided based on the situation in 1994. This 
moment is considered as a reference point when discussing the foundation of the new 
JSC. 
On December 31 the total debt of Republic of Moldova for  “Gazprom” for supplied gas 
constituted 191 million US dollars (excluding the penalties), including 100 million that are 
afferent to the right side of Dnester and 91 million afferent to the left side. At the same 
time the value of the participation patrimony of the 2 parties from both banks of Dnester 
were divided in the following way: $80,33 million were afferent to the right side of Dnester 
(equivalent to 343 million lei ) and $22,7 (equivalent to 96,8 million lei). As it was mentioned 
before in the section 2.1, there has been not verifiable data provided in 1994 which could 
confirm the declared value of Transnitrian property. Moldova acknowledged the value of 
this property by simply signing an inventory act which was conducting at its turn also by 
„Tiraspoltransgaz” without knowing the initial value on the base of which the inventory 
checking was done. Moreover in the inventory act „Tiraspoltransgaz” indicated the length of 
the gas pipe routes as being its property including: 39,5 km from the ATI gas pipe line (out 
of 18,8 km which currently span on the territory of Transnitria) and 34,0 km of the RI gas line 
(out of existing 24,3 km ). At the same time the inventory act does not comprise the other 
portions of the gas pipe routes which cross the separatist region (15 km of the ADCB and 
23,1 km of SDKRI), which  is another proof to the poor quality of the works conducted by the 
Tiraspol authorities. This implies an actual thought whether to believe or not the document 
which was the basis according to which Moldova-Gaz was founded. The evidence proves 
that in 1994 when founding “Gazsnabtranzit”, the Tirapol parties participated with a share 
of patrimony from its territory. This fraud was ignored by the governing administration 
from Chisinau.
As a result in conditions when none of the official numbers regarding the patrimony of 
gas pipe line assets and the debts of Republic of Moldova to “Gazprom” do not reflect the 
actual reality of that time. Both Ministry of Privatization and State Property Administration 
and Ministry of Finance did not accept Government’s law project according which was 
stipulating “the establishment of the moldo-russian closed JSC „Gazsnabtranzit”. This is 
proven by a lack of acceptance signatures of the 2 bodies. Despite committing these frauds 
on 12 may 1995 the government of Republic of Moldova adopts Decision nr.302 which 
stipulated the establishment of „Gazsnabtranzit”. It is important to mention that in this 
context the decision was not published in the „Monitorul Oficial”, which does not entitle it 
to any legal power. With all this, the newly formed enterprise was registered immediately 
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based on the registration permission issued by 
the Ministry of Privatization and State Property 
Administration. This body later refused to co-sign 
the project according to which the enterprise 
was created.
As a result the process that was launched with 
multiple ignorance of the legislation of Republic 
of Moldova resulted that on August 11, 1995 
JSC “Gazsnabtranzit” was established having 
439,9 million lei statutory (343,1 being afferent 
to the right side of Dnester and having its value 
underestimated; 96,8 were declared by the left 
bank based on a inventory act as aleatory sums 
of money). “Gazprom” contributed in the newly 
created JSC only with $ 51,5 million, which 
were extracted from the artificially created 
debt of Republic of Moldova to the Russian gas 
supplier. This helped “Gazprom” to obtain 50% + 
1 privileged share. The remaining 39% and 11% 
were the participation shares of „Tiraspoltransgaz” 
(see Diagram 2). 
Based on this irrelevant data the patrimony 
should have been divided in the following way: 
based on the net contribution of each party. In 
other words from the patrimonial contribution 
of “Moldovatransgaz” it was necessary to deduct 
from $51,5 million the afferent debt of the party 
from the right side of Dnester. The afferent debt of 
the left bank of Dnester had to be deducted from 
patrimonial contribution of „Tiraspoltransgaz”. 
Due to the significant gap between the 
repartition of the gas pipe route patrimony (even 
based on the calculations made by authorities 
78% of the patrimony belonged to the right side 
of the Dnester and the remaining 22% – to the 
left side) and the debt repartition (52,5% - debt 
of the right side and 47,5% debt of the left side). 
By making these calculations we will obtain that 
the administration from the right side of Dnester 
contributed with a net amount of 51,8% at the 
“Gazsnabtranzit” establishment. Transnistrian 
share constituted 1,8%. 
In other words Tirapol had to pay back Moldova 
another 7,8 million lei. The Central Gas Pile line 
assets (including the ones from the territory on the 
left side of Dnester) had to be divided equally between “Gazprom” and “Moldovatransgaz”. 
Below we are presenting calculations made based on real values of the patrimony debts.
Calculations made using wrong data
The situation according to veridical information and 
calculation method when buying back 50,5 mln $ in 
debt value
Diagram 2. Property share distribution when 
establishing “Gazsnabtranzit” in 1995
The picture represent the situation based on veridical 
data and calculations made providing that Moldova 
paid back all it’s debts to “Gazprom” which totaled 
180 mln $ as of 01.01.1995 
Diagram 3. Participation shares when “Gazsnabtranzit” 
was established in 1995
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It is necessary to outline that the value of the gas transit business to Balkan states 
(excluding the ADCB gas route) constituted when establishing moldo-russian 
“Gazsnabtranzit” approximately 4 billion lei. From this amount almost 3 billion were 
afferent to “Moldovatransgaz”. Taking into account that debt to “Gazprom” was diminished 
by 220 million lei (equivalent to 51,5 million US dollars) the property shares when 
establishing “Gazsnabtranzit” had to be divided in the following way: “Gazprom” – 5,51%, 
“Moldovatransgaz” – 72,11%, „Tiraspoltransgaz” – 22,38%. If Moldova decided to pay off 
its debts to “Gazprom”, which at that point constituted at that moment not more than $ 
180 million  (including all the penalties), the participation share in “Gazsnabtranzit” should 
have had the following structure: „Gazprom” – 19,24%, „Moldovatransgaz” – 64,91%, 
„Tiraspoltransgaz” – 15,85% (see Diagram 3). Therefore it can be seen that it was possible 
to avoid the further penalty calculation for late payments. In this case Republic of Moldova 
would have maintained its control over the price for gas transit through its own territory.
Artificial increase of debt of Republic of Moldova 2.5. 
to “Gazprom” in 1995-1997
After what the new moldo-russian JV “Gazsnabtranzit” was established the property issue in 
the topic of supplying Republic of Moldova with natural gas continued to evolve according 
to the scenario which was built in 1994: using different means, Republic of Moldova was 
accumulating enormous debts that could be later transformed into diverse property forms 
over country’s patrimony. The debt inflation strategy has thrown shadow over the gas debt 
structure of Transnistria.
In order to evaluate the impact and effective results of these actions, it is necessary that we 
outline some reference points:
The price for gas which Republic of Moldova was supplied with in 1995-2004 was •	
established at the constant $ 80 benchmark for 1000 m3. 
The price for transiting gas across the territory of Republic of Moldova remained •	
unchanged since 1995. It’s value constituted $ 2,66 for 1000 m3 per 100 km.
The penalty rate for each late date of debt payment was established at 0,02% in 1995 •	
(compared to 0,35% in 1994).
Between January 1 1995 until January 1 1998, Republic of Moldova consumed 9,43 •	
billion cubic  meters of gas, including 5,68 which was consumer exclusively on the 
territory to the right of Dnester.
In the same period 78 billion cubic meters of gas transited across the territory of •	
Moldova to Balkan states. 
The debts accumulated by Republic of Moldova (both territories from Dnester) have •	
increased from $ 190 millions at the end of 1995 (including 140 million of penalties) to 
$ 361,6 million with over $ 149 million of penalties as of January 1 1998.
Meanwhile in this time frame Republic of Moldova paid $ 378,4 million in debts, out of •	
which $ 357,3 million is pure debt of the territory to the right side of Dnester.
We will examine further the debt formation and management for gas consumption in the 
following 3 years, without repeating the situation with debt inflation with over $ 150 million 
by the beginning of 1995.
Even though the price for transiting gas across the territory of Moldova was increase from 
1,5 to 2,66 dollars for 1000 m3 per 100 km, it was not done proportionally with the increase in 
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price for gas.  If this adjustment would have been done (which could be possible if Moldova 
would not have given away to “Gazprom” its 50% participation share in „Gazsnabtranzit”), 
the the price for transiting gas across the Moldova territory should have been $ 3,117 for 
100’000 m3.km. This is the only reason why Republic of Moldova (both territories from 
Dnester) during within 3 years (1995-1997) $35,6 million in profit. This is the exact debt 
amount which “Gazprom” had to deduct from its account for Moldova.
Another method according to which the debts of Moldova were inflated was the irrational 
if not criminal way of managing the debts. As it has been mentioned before for each 
day of late payment Moldova had to pay in 1994 0,35% from the total amount that was 
due. In 1995 this interest rate was reduced to 0,02%. At the end of 1994 the total debt of 
Moldova (excluding the penalties) constituted $ 190 million. Between 1995-1997 Moldova 
paid $ 378,4 million in debt. As of January 1 1998 according to verification act of the debts 
„Moldovagaz” to “Gazprom” the penalties which were calculated for remaining amount 
of gas consumer in 1994 constituted $39,3 million. This summer was inflated 17 times 
(0,35/0,02). In fact this ratio is even greater because money paid in this period covered 
the debts which were penalized with 0,02% for each day of delay instead of covering the 
penalties which constituted 0,35% for each day of delay. the penalties for these 3 years 
were increased by 37 million dollars. 
The situation with the debts of Republic of Moldova was confounded even more when the 
amount of money for gas that was transiting across the territory of Moldova was not paid 
directly by „Gazprom”. Based on some calculations the price for this gas was reduced to 22 
dollars for 1000 m3. This method was applied by “Gazprom” in relations with other countries. 
However their internal consumption and the volume of gas that was transiting the territory 
was fluctuating independently without any connection between the 2 variables. It is to be 
mentioned that our country is characterized by having an ongoing conflict with the separatist 
authorities. This resulted in having the patrimony of the gas supply and transition network 
divided and being under partial control of the separatist authorities. Even if we take into 
account the property shares when „Gazsnabtranzit” was established, which have been wrongly 
calculated, Transnistria had to own  22% from the total amount of gas that was transiting the 
territory and 78% belonged to the territory on the right side of Dnester. 
Once that this money was converted into a reduction in gas purchasing price from 80 to 58 
dollars for 1000 cubic meters of gas, this money had to be distributed  not proportionally 
to participation assets  but proportionally to consumption. Knowing that the share of 
Transnistria in the total amount of gas consumption constituted 40% during the 3 years 
it acquired $ 83 million from the $207,5 million in revenues from gas transition. Moldova 
gained $124,5 millions. In reality if we look at the participation share in „Gazsnabtranzit”, 
Transnistria was supposed to receive $45,6 million and Moldova $161,9 millions. Therefore 
those who paid during the 3 years almost 95% of money for consumed gas to Russian 
Federation were deprived from another $37,5 millions.
Table 3. Debt repartition of Republic of Moldova to “Gazprom” by Janury 1st 1998, millions US dollars
Scenarios: Total
Right 
territory to 
Dnester
Left territory 
to Dnester
According to conditions that were accepter by 
Republic of Moldova in 1994-1997, 
including penalties:
510,8
149,18
141,26 
41,26
369,54 
107,92
If Moldova paid back its debts when establishing  
„Gazsnabtranzit”,
including penalties:
104,93
-30,10
-107,36 
 
-43,02
212,29 
 
12,92
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As a consequence the debt of Republic of Moldova to “Gazprom” the end of 1997 constituted 
$510,8 millions. This is including penalties in the amount of $149 millions.  The debt was 
inflated by at least $222,6 millions . Consumers from the territory to the right of Dnester 
were charged another $37,5 which in fact should’ve been the responsibility of consumers 
from the opposite territory. If Moldova managed in 1995 to pay back its debt to “Gazprom” 
when „Gazsnabtranzit” was established using its patrimony (see section 2.4), country’s debt 
to “Gazprom” by 1998 would have only been 104, 9 million US dollars (see table 3). The 
negative values from this table indicate the over payments that were made. Therefore the 
administration from the right territory to Dnester paid with $107,36 millions more than the 
actual debt. The penalties that were calculated were $30 million higher than the cumulative 
amount paid by both territorial units.  In real terms  if the property structure is preserved 
for „Gazsnabtranzit” as it is presented in Diagram 3 , „Tiraspoltransgaz” had to pay $104,93 
millions to “Gazprom” and $107,36 millions to “Moldovatransgaz”.
Therefore after harming the interest of Moldova in 1994-1995 by $566 millions (giving 
away the property at a price of $51,5 millions which in fact cost $468 millions), Moldovan 
administration continued accepting conditions which resulted in a loss of another $76 
millions by 1998. 
In the following chapter we will examine how this money was converted into property right 
over the entire distribution and natural gas supply system.
The give up of patrimony of Republic of Moldova 2.6. 
in 1997-1998 when establishing „Moldovagaz”
In conditions when by 1998 the debt of Republic of Moldova for gas constituted almost 
half a billion dollars, the same technique was applied as in 1994 in order to decrease this 
debt: giving away a part of the supply and distribution gas assets.  On January 19 1997, 
on the basis of the Republic Production Association „Moldovagaz”, the Central Enterprise 
JSC „Moldovagaz Concern” was created. Following this year in October 1997 as a result of 
negotiations conducted by the vice-prime minister of Republic of Moldova and deputy 
president of “Gazprom” it was agreed to create in the IV quarter of 1997 the mixed JSC with 
the participation of the following legal entities:
“gazprom” with the participation share which constituted the debt of moldova as •	
of July 1, 1997;
ministry of Privatization and republic of moldova State Property Administration;•	
Coordination committee of Property in transnistria.•	
According to the minutes taken as a result of the negotiations the statutory capital of the 
newly formed enterprise should be composed from the following:
The value of of the social capital of the Closed JSC „Gazsnabtranzit”,•	
The share value of sate participation in „Moldovagaz”;•	
The value of property of the gasification enterprises in Transnistria;•	
Value of shares of other people, shareholders of „Moldovagaz”.•	
The same document stipulates evaluation methodology of assets of the newly created 
enterprise which has to be done according to the legislation of Republic of Moldova. 
According to p.6 of this document at the beginning of 1998 the asset value of the enterprise 
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will be recalculated taking into account the world market price. The occurring modification 
in asset  value will be added to the statutory capital of the enterprise.
This stipulation is a proof that the value of assets of Republic of Moldova were known at the 
moment when negotiations were conducted and it will be irrelevant from the economic 
point of view. In this case the asset reevaluation for adjusting the economic value could 
have been done before the mixed enterprise was established. Moreover the contract for 
establishing „Moldovagaz” was signed in October 23, 1998 after the assets were already 
reevaluated. This implies that the new enterprise could have been formed assets whose 
value has already been recalculated.
Table 4. Central Gas Line routes which have been included in „Gazsnabtranzit” 
as of 31.12.1994 and 01.07.1997, km
territory to the 
right of dnester 
territory to the 
left of dnestrer total
Total Central Gas Line routes including:
ADCB	
ATI	
ŞDKRI	
RI	
461,74 
184,80
73,30
101,48
102,16
81,2 
15,00
18,80
23,10
24,30
542,94 
199,80
92,10
124,58
126,46
As of 31 December 1994: 
ADCB	
ATI	
ŞDKRI	
RI	
184,80 
184,80
73,50 
39,50
34,00
258,30 
184,80
39,50
34,00
As of 1 July 1997:
ADCB	
ATI	
ŞDKRI	
RI	
305,00 
184,80
20,70
50,20
49,30
81,20 
15,00
18,80
23,10
24,30
386,20 
199,80
39,50
73,30
34,00
Central Gas Lines that have not been 
included by the end of 1997
ADCB	
ATI	
ŞDKRI	
RI	
156,74 
0,00
52,60
51,28
52,86
0,00 
0,00
0,00
0,00
0,00
156,74 
0,00
52,60
51,28
52,86
Thus after re-evaluation the value of assets which were part of the statutory capi-
tal of „Gazsnabtranzit” increased by 86,8%. At the same time the participation share 
of “Gazprom” remained unchanged at 50%, while the value of Transnistrian shares 
increased from 11% to 21,4% after decrease of asset share from 39% to 28,59% of 
Transnistria. Table 4 outlines the patrimony which was included in calculations when 
conducting the re-evaluation. The following conclusions can be drawn from this:
Only central gas lines that were part of contribution of Moldova’ property to “Gaz-1. 
snabtranzit” social capital were re-evaluated. Proportionally to the increase of 
their value, the share value of  “Gazprom”  (composed from the debts of Moldova 
for the gas that was consumer) has increased too. According to the available data 
when the share value of “Gazprom” increased by 191 million lei, the debt of Re-
public of Moldova to the Russian monopoly did not diminish, which means that 
Breaking the 
legislation and the 
„Gazsnabtranzit” 
foundation 
contract Republic 
of Moldova makes 
„Gazprom” 
another „gift” 
of $40 mln. in 
1998...
T H E  G A Z E  I N D U S T R Y  I N  R M :    T H E  B U R D E N  O F  I G N O R A N C E  A N D  T H E  C O S T  O F  E R R O R S
19
the country made another “gift” to the supplier of $41,2 million (the exchange rate 
was 4,63 for 1 dollar).
Having in mind that the length of Gas Pipe lines increased by 65%, their value 2. 
increased by only 37%. The10,5% increase of gas line for “Tiraspoltransgaz” was 
translated into a 263,5% increase in value which absolutely unrealistic from any 
point of view.
It is difficult to imagine that people who conducted the re-evaluation of assets 3. 
which were to be included later in the statutory capital of „Gazsnabtranzit” could 
not have noticed another 155 km of gas routes which cross the territory located 
to the right of the Dnester. It is 50 km from each of the 3 gas routes which trans-
port gas to Balkans. This lead to modifications in property structure within the 
newly established enterprise and inadequate income repartition coming from 
gas transition, leaving consumers from the Moldova robbed.
Further on the Department for Privatization and State Property Administration pro-
poses the Government to increase the total value of distribution, supply and trans-
portation assets to 1`333 millions of lei, including the cost of Central Gas Pipe routes 
to 821,81 millions of lei. This would mean that the value of the medium and low pres-
sure distribution networks was estimated at 511 millions of lei (as of 01 July 1997). 
This is equivalent to $ 111,1 millions taken at the 4,6 lei per 1 dollar exchange rate. We 
have to mention that this evaluation is irrelevant from economic point of view since 
in 1994-1997 after what the price for gas increased to $80/1000 m3, Republic of Mol-
dova using this distribution network was annually consuming gas in the total value of 
$240-260 millions. As you will see in Chapter 3, by applying the calculated tariff using 
misleading legislation, the gas distribution business profitability using this system 
constituted 10% from this amount. Respectively this is at least $30 millions per year. 
The approximate value of the selling gas business in Moldova is estimated to be $145 
millions (applying the methodology from Annex 2). As a result of this we encountered 
another prejudice to Republic of Moldova of $34 millions. “Gazprom” received $17 
millions from that amount.
In October 21, 1998 the Government of Republic of Moldova adopts the Act nr. 1068 
according to which it accepts the offer of Department for Privatization and Public 
Property Administration to establish JSC “Moldovagaz”. This has been done by violat-
ing the Foreign Investment Law (April 1, 1998) which 
stipulates that when state property is being depos-
ited in the statutory fund of a JSC, it has to be evalu-
ated according to international prices. In October 23, 
1998 the Government signed the contract according 
to which “Moldovagaz” was established, having a 
1’333 millions of lei statutory capital. This capital (see 
diagram 4) was divided in the following way: “Gaz-
prom” – 50% plus one share, „Tiraspoltransgaz” (using 
both Central Gas Route assets and the distribution 
gas assets) – 13,4%, „Moldovatransgaz” (using Central 
Gas Route assets) – 20,3% and „Moldovagaz” (using 
distribution network made of „raigazuri” – territorial 
agencies on the level of raion(district)) – 16,3%. It is 
practically impossible to explain de jure and de facto 
the situation which further was taking place:
Diagram 4. Property share repartition when 
establishing S.A.”Moldovagaz” in 1998
Current situation
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First of all the moldo-russian enterprise „Gazsnabtranzit” was not abolished and 	
was not among the founders of JSC „Moldovagaz”. Therefore the Central Gas Pipe 
lines were part of its property and were also part of the social capital of „Moldova-
gaz” 
Even though Moldova made an additional contribution of low and medium pres-	
sure gas pipe lines to “Gazsnabtranzit”, whose value was underestimated to $111,1 
millions in 1998 and 1999 there is no data proving that “Gazprom” diminished the 
debt of Republic of Moldova for consumed gas. The fact alone can be taken as a 
motive for canceling the contract according to which “Moldovagaz” was estab-
lished and return to the situation from 1997.
The foundation contract was not registered within 2 months as it was stipulated 	
according to the legislation. It was resisted on May 25 1997, which 7 months after 
the date when the enterprise was established. This is another reason for which the 
contract should’ve been canceled.
Below we will present the situation in real terms, 
according to calculations made in Annex 2 and 
with regard to information presented in sections 
2.2-2.5 (see diagram 5). Therefore, even if Mol-
dova would have paid back its entire debt as of 
end of 1997 with patrimony to “Gazprom” ($105 
millions, afferent to Transnistria), then, keeping 
in mind that it was necessary to add 670 million 
lei to the statutory capital of  “Gazsnabtranzit” (4 
billion lei) –  which is the real value of the gas 
distribution system the new JSC had to have 
the following structure of the statutory capital: 
“Gazprom” – 26,83%, Ministry of Privatization 
and State Property Administration of Moldova– 
64,23%, Coordination Committee of the Transn-
istrian Property– 8,94%. As it can be seen the 
share of the right bank of Dnester was remaining 
almost unchanged comparatively to 1998 versus 
the total value of the social capital which has in-
creased. The share of “Gazprom” should have increased on account of  Moldova’s debt 
which was supposed to be fully extinguished.
Starting with 1999 the situation was evolving based on the new realities after “Mol-
dovagaz” was established. Republic of Moldova continued to accumulate debts, es-
pecially the territory to the left of Dnester. In December 2005, “Gazprom” sold the 1,2 
billion debt to a US company „Factoring-Finans” Ltd, which is a also owned by the 
Russian monopolist. From this amount 120,1 millions constituted the debt of the ter-
ritory to the right of Dnester and 567 millions main debt of the territory to the left of 
Dnester. The other 500 millions in penalties were divided more or less proportionally 
to the main debt. Starting with 2005 the territory to the right of Dnester started to 
pay back fully for gas consumption. There have been no other modifications in the 
property structure over the Moldovan gas transport, supply and distribution were 
not encountered. In this section we will demonstrate that this structure had to be 
modified towards increasing the share of Moldovan participation, and potentially 
participation share of “Gazprom” if the latter one would have decreased the debt of 
Republic of Moldova.
According to 
the available 
information 
„Gazprom” did 
not deposit yet its 
share of partici-
pation in „Mol-
dovagaz” which 
had to be done 
by diminishing 
the debt of Re-
public of Mol-
dova by $55,5 
millions...
Based on veridical data and calculations
Diagram 5. Property Share Repartition Repartizarea 
when establsihing  JSC.”Moldovagaz” in 1998
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The situation with local distribution networks 2.7. 
(2001-2006)
Based on the data we have, starting with 2000-2001, there were several infrastructure 
and local development projects launched in Republic of Moldova including rural and 
urban gasification projects. These projects being demanded by the local population 
implied the use of local and foreign investments. They supplemented the budgetary 
sources allocated for implementation of these projects. The most important contribu-
tion in this regard had special funds (including the ones administered by MSIF – Mol-
dova Social Investment Fund being mostly financed with credits from World Bank), 
individual people. There were tens of millions of US dollars allocated using direct 
financing to which community contribution is added. 
Before examining in detail the amounts of money that were invested in these proj-
ects from credits that were obtained by Republic of Moldova administration, special 
allocations from national, sub-national and local budgets, it is necessary to stress 
the idea that in the contract according to which “Moldovagaz” was established it is 
stipulated that the enterprise is responsible for modernization, extension and main-
tenance of gas distribution and transportation networks on the territory of Republic 
of Moldova. This is a fair stipulation because “Moldovagaz” is th enterprise who will 
be directly benefiting from network exploitation and receiving the profit. The com-
pany is neither a philanthropic organization neither it is a ghost company and at the 
same does not bear any responsibility for its clients. Moreover this enterprise has 
monopoly power over gas distribution and transportation. Respectively there is no 
other organization which has the institutional capacity to exercise the obligation of 
network maintenance and extension. On the other hand gasification is not solely im-
portant to the joint enterprise. It is also in the interest of the citizens because it is a 
cheaper and more comfortable mean for supplying energy. The same applies for the 
state of Republic of Moldova. This issue has political importance because it also helps 
to preserve the forest and improves the general ecology. In this context it is logical to 
have the state’s and citizen’s implication in extending the gas pipe line network and 
implicitly in gas consumption. Nonetheless the financial contribution of Republic of 
Moldova and its citizens has to be compensated by “Moldovagaz”, which assumed the 
responsibility to conduct these works on its own account.
According to the report of Ministry of Economy, which was presented during the Par-
liament’s session in April 6 2006, the total amount of budgetary investments (both 
national and local budge) for extending gas distribution networks constituted 900 
millions lei, which is equivalent to $69,2 millions (at the 13:1 rate of exchange). This 
number does not include the investments made by MSIF and the investments made 
by population during the last 16 years. At this session, Ministry of Economy assumed 
the responsibility to make a detailed report and present it to the Parliament in which 
it will include the estimative value of these investments. However in 2006 this report 
was never presented by Ministry of Economy, which can be explained either that this 
report was not made public at all or it never reached the Parliament. 
Based on the information published on the website of MSIF, in the past 2 and a half 
years (January 1 2004 – July 1 2006), there were $12 million allocated to be invested 
for extending Moldova’s distribution networks. There is no information regarding the 
amounts of money that were invested by citizens and neither MSIF publishes the 
cumulative value of these investments. It would be better if the numbers from MSIF 
Today a part of 
the gas distribu-
tion network is 
not listed on the 
balance sheet of 
„Moldovagaz”. 
Nonetheless 
consumers have 
to pay the cost 
for its mainte-
nance...
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included also this data in order to obtain a general picture of the infrastructure proj-
ects (budget, MSIF, citizen’s contribution). According to estimations made by experts 
from IDIS Viitorul these investments equal to 2 billion lei.
This patrimony whose present value is $160 million is a juridical vacuum: it is not 
included in the balance sheet of  “Moldovagaz”, respectively  this enterprise does 
not have any responsibility in case any exploitation problems occur.  It is not even 
allow including this property on the balance sheet of local authorities who contrib-
uted to building this estate. Nonetheless “Moldovagaz” is constantly using these net-
works and according to the data presented by National Agency of Energy Regulation 
(NAER), in 2006 the gas consumption in households increased by 2.5%, which leads 
to a profit increase for „Moldovagaz”. Knowing that this property is not on balance 
sheet of “Moldovagaz”, NAER can see itself motivated to increase the tariffs for gas. 
This intention was stipulated in agency’s press release dating February 14, 2007. In 
the framework of consumer protection this situation has to be solved urgently.
IDIS experts suggest several methods which could resolve the current situation in 
terms of gas distribution networks in RM: 
The networks can be transmitted on the balance sheet of “Moldovagaz”, at their 1. 
whole value, respectively increasing the share of Republic of Moldova (particu-
larly –territory from to the right from Dnester) in the statutory capital of this en-
terprise. Or if “Gazprom” intends to maintain the property share, it has to decrease 
the debt of Moldova (if there are any debts left using realistic calculations, see 
Conclusions) for consumed gas has to be diminished proportionally to the partici-
pation share of the Russian monopoly. In this case money used from citizens to 
build new gas lines can be paid back by S.A. “Moldovagaz” by supplying gas at the 
price when the investment was made.
Based on the investments made for network built-up it is possible to establish 2. 
regional distribution companies which will have contractual relations with “Mol-
dovagaz” in the framework of the national legislation. The property in these en-
terprises has to be divided proportionally with the investments made by the state 
and the citizens.
“Moldovagaz” can purchase the property of these networks either by paying 3. 
money or supplying cheaper gas to compensate the price difference.
It is important that citizen who invested in gasification of their living community 
have to stipulate their payment on paper. Today a major part of their sums are not 
stipulated anywhere on paper, therefore there is no economic and legal proof for 
this money to be returned by “Moldovagaz” or Russian monopoly. Another important 
observation is that even though the distribution system of the natural gas was ap-
praised in 1998 at $111,1 millions extension of these networks in 2001-2006 by 78,6% 
(total length increased by 7000 km up to 12500 km) demanded investments that to-
taled $160 millions (144%). IDIS experts that these discrepancies are due to the fact 
that from the very start, the patrimony of Republic of Moldova was drastically under 
evaluated in 1998. After this Moldova had to endure the consequences of high ex-
penses for building distribution networks in 2001 until present days.
To ensure the integrity, continuity and comparability of representations, we will ex-
amine below the effects of converting the entire debt of Republic of Moldova from 
It is estimated 
that citizens paid 
500 millions lei. 
This amount has 
to be reimbursed 
either by shares 
from “Moldova-
gaz” or partici-
pation share in 
the regional gas 
distribution com-
panies...
Citizens who 
invested in 
gasification 
need to stipulate 
their actions on 
paper...
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the end of 2996 into property over gas supply, transportation and distribution sys-
tem (if we use the first method out of the that were described above). If we take as a 
reference the situation that was presented in diagram 5 (beginning of 1998) and the 
debts that were accumulated during 1998-2006, then purchasing the debts by letting 
“Gazprom” participate in the statutory capital of „Moldovagaz” would lead to its in-
crease by at least 13,3 billion lei with property share repartition as follows: “Gazprom” 
-- 68,43%, territory to the right of Dnester -- 75,61%, „Tiraspoltransgaz”: – 44,04%, 
which means that the accumulated debts by Transnistria are 2 as big as its value of 
patrimony. When conducting these estimations were took into account the following 
aspects:
Estimative value of the distribution network constituted in 2001-2006 2 billion 	
lei.
The value of the gas transition business from the statutory capital had to be ad-	
justed with the exchange rate fluctuations (US dollar).
It is obvious that this structure of the statutory capital is not possible. If the debt of 
Transnistria would have been divided proportionally to the participation shares of 
other participants, then “Gazprom” would need to recuperate from the separatist re-
gime another 2,78 billion lei, or $209 million calculated at the 13,29:1 exchange rate 
as of December 31, 2006. At its turn administration from Moldova could claim for 3,07 
billion lei, which is $ 231 millions. 
These amounts represent credits or grants (be-
cause it was little possible to recuperate these 
amounts having an illegal regime) that have 
been offered to separatist authorities by “Gaz-
prom” and Government of Republic of Moldova. 
In other terms this is a way to finance the sepa-
ratist regime. This calculation does not comprise 
money paid by consumers from the territory to 
the right of Dnester, gas and losses afferent to 
the left side territory using the inflated tariff 
which could have increased even more the debt 
of Transnistria for the government of Moldova. 
In other words this is a way to finance the sep-
aratist regime by Republic of Moldova. In such 
conditions “Gazprom” would own 47,51% from 
the statutory capital of . „Moldovagaz” (13,3 bil-
lion lei), and the enterprises that manage the gas 
transportation and distribution on the right side 
territory would own the remaining 52,49% (see 
diagram 6).
Based on veridical data and calculations
Diagram 6. Property share repartition in JSC 
“Moldovagaz” as of 31 December 2006
48%
52%
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nAturAL gAS tAxAtion PoLiCy3. 
In the previous chapter we analyzed the situation of gas supply in Republic of Moldova 
and its transit in the framework of patrimonial relations of “Gazprom” and organizations 
which were managing this process on both sides of Dnester. In this chapter we will analyze 
the relations between the gas supply and distribution business and its clients (natural gas 
consumers) especially with those on the right territory to Dnester because there is data 
available for conducting the analysis.
It is necessary to outline that due to the fact that the natural gas distribution system 
represents a monopoly and has a series of economic and political interests, the relations 
with clients have some specific features. The main feature is that the price for gas cannot be 
established by the company which supplies it, but is an object of negotiations between the 
company, whose natural interest is to maximize its profit and the government whose role is 
to keep the prices constant or low for citizens, public institutions and businesses. Further on 
we will examine how governmental authorities at different stages starting with 1994 until 
present days played their role of consumer protectors and what were the effects of their 
public policies in this domain over national economy and every citizen taken in part.
The gas tariff calculated in 
Moldovan lei for 1000 cubic 
meters had the following 
dynamics versus the price 
for natural gas supplied 
to Republic of Moldova 
adjusted to currency ex-
change for each period(see 
diagram 71):
August 1, 1994 – 	
March 1, 1995 differentiat-
ed average tariff for differ-
ent consumer categories--
421 lei2. 
March 1, 1995 – 	
July 1,1997: the tariff is de-
creased to 331 lei.
July 1, 1997 – Sep-	
tember 9, 1998: Average 
tariff increases to 454 lei.
September 9 – December 15, 1998: the tariff is decreased to 370 lei.	
December15, 1998 – June 25, 1999: the newly established tariff is 638 lei.	
June 25, 1999 – July 1, 2003 the tariff for gas is 926 lei.	
After a short period (1-15 July 2003) when the tariff was 1079 lei, it was decreased 	
slightly to 1058 lei remaining at this level until March 1, 2004.
March 1, 2004 – February 17, 2006 average tariff constitutes 1083 lei.	
February 17 – July 21, 2006:  Natural gas tariff was 1553 lei.	
July 21, 2006 – February 14, 2007: the tariff was calculated at 2335 lei, resulting after-	
wards in 2545 lei, remaining valid at present moment.
1   The tariff that is presented in the diagram and text does not include VAT= 5%.
2    Arythmetic Averag for different consumer groups; there is not data regarding natural consumption for this period, therefore 
it is impossible to calcualte the weighted average.
Diagram 7. Natural gas de facto tariff evolution versus adjusted real gas price 
for gas (august 1994-april 2007)
Based on veridical data and calculations
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It is important that tariff reduction in 1995 and 1998 took place at the initiative and order 
of specific people, who are representatives of central power. They managed to present 
calculations and demonstrate that the actual tariff was inflated. Even though the calculations 
made by these authorities show that the tariff reduction should have been even greater and 
based on the de facto tariffs fro this period, then diagram 7 indicates clearly what should 
have been the real difference between the tariff and the price for gas. In the past time and 
especially in the latest years this difference became enormous. Population from the right 
territory to Dnester had to pay annually additional tens of millions of dollars..
The structure of tariff is strictly regulated and stipulates positions that can participate when 
calculating the tariff. Unfortunately experts from IDIS had access only to data regarding 
tariff structure from 1996. This data was obtained as a result of an inquiry made by the Court 
of Accounts in 2000-2001. This is why we will further provide less updated examples (1996) 
of methods used to inflate the tariff. In other words the principles used when compounding 
the tariff remained unchanged. Therefore they can be applied when analyzing the existent 
tariff when its structure will be made public.
The problem of the “lost” gas 3.1. 
According to the information that is available, the 1996 tariff included gas losses which 
totaled 41,4 millions lei, or $ 9 millions at the 4,6:1 exchange rate as of 1996. This is 155 
million of cubic meters of gas (calculated at $58  per 1000 cub. M purchase price with 
transit discount) or 5% from the entire amount of gas that was consumed in Republic 
of Moldova including the separatist region. 
This is an unacceptable proportion of loss, which is exaggerated in regards to standards 
in this branch and even in regards to reports of „Moldovagaz”, which stipulates that its 
gas technological losses sum up to 7,2 million lei.
In order to explain how these losses occur it is necessary to mention that the meters 
which track the volume of gas which enters and leaves the territory of Moldova are lo-
cated in Ukraine, at 40km distance from our border. The meter which tracks the volume 
of gas that exists Moldova in the ADCB gas line is situated in Ukraine as well in the Cer-
nauti region. If you look at the Annex 1, which has the map of all gas routes that trans-
port gas to Balkans then it can be see that they intersect the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
border several times. However there are no meters installed on these portions which 
could allow us to calculate the exact volume of gas which was consumed in Republic of 
Moldova and Ukraine. In order to make the loss repartition, a moldo-ukrainean commis-
sion is being summoned ever year which divides these volumes among the 2 countries 
through negotiation. The public community, local experts from Republic of Moldova 
have never received answers to what these negotiations mean, what is the procedure 
according to which the repartition is made, what is the loss estimation method. On 
top of this, the statute and working documents of this commission, its members, and 
even minutes have never been made public and were not even presented at Republic 
of Moldova Court of Account’s inquiry, when the latter one conducted an activity audit 
of JSC „Moldovagaz” in 2000-2001. Any clarification over the gas consumption subject, 
that are initiated by public authorities have to begin from creating conditions in which 
transparency and public control over key elements of the existent administrative sys-
tem  will not raise suspicions and fit in the state’s organization.
The meters 
which are used 
to track the 
volume of gas 
which enters and 
exists the terri-
tory of Repub-
lic of Moldova 
are located in 
Ukraine, at 30-
40 km distance 
from our border 
which results 
in hundreds of 
millions of cubic 
meters of gas or 
dollars in an-
nual loss ...
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It is obvious that gas theft does exist. However when adding up the volumes of gas that 
is considered to have been stolen, this would mean that during an entire century, those 
who are responsible for managing the gas transportation and distribution system did not 
undertake any efforts to solve this issue. In addition to this, not one single Lei, was paid by 
separatist regime. Money was put on the balance sheet of „Moldovagaz” and respectively 
consumers had to pay this money which was reflected in the gas tariff. It is impossible that 
the separatist land did not have any implication in this affair. This argumentation implies 
that it is not the physical loss of gas by more likely political will to steal the money from 
consumers on the right territory to Dnester. On the other hand these losses represent an 
important margin for reducing the tariff: for example in 1996 after eliminating all non-
technological losses, the tariff had to be decreased by 20 lei or 4.5% from the existing 
tariff.
Including in the tariff for population on the 3.2. 
territory to the right of Dnester the afferent 
expenses of the Transnistrian region
In the previous chapter (see section 2.5) we mentioned that the situation regarding 
the gas transit income repartition between the left and right territory to Dnester was 
modified by reducing unilaterally of the gas purchasing price from Russia from 80 to 50 
US dollars at expense of services for transiting natural gas across the territory of Republic 
of Moldova. It was ignored however that the share of Transnistrian gas consumption was 
much greater than its contribution to gas transit (according to the property structure in 
“Gazsnabtranzit”). By making these frauds, in just 3 years consumers from the right territory 
to Dnester had to pay additionally over $37,5 millions! However if we consider that the 
income from gas transit during the 3 years would be split in a 40% to 60% proportion 
(separatist region and the opposite territory), then the afferent expenses for gas transit 
and distribution would have been entirely transmitted on Moldovan account with the 
following clarification: „de „Tiraspoltransgaz” services for gas transportation”. After what 
Moldovan authorities accepted these expenses (which in 1996 constituted over 9 million 
lei), the gas consumption tariff was inflated to 5,38 lei, or by 1,2%.
Illegal increase of the profitability margin3.3. 
Another way frequently used by enterprise’s administration to inflate the tariff was 
„increasing the profitability margin”. The legislation of Republic of Moldova stipulates a 10% 
profitability margin for companies with a monopolistic power on the market of the country. 
This margin has to be applied only on production expenses, while branch enterprises also 
applied the 10% margin on the gas purchasing price. This tariff policy contradicts the 
legislation of Republic of Moldova because the gas that is being purchased is not being 
processed. Respectively it has to be considered “merchandise” and not “raw material” or 
“finished goods”. With this having on hand the government of Republic of Moldova does 
not take any actions against this measure. This results in tariff inflation by another 26,8 lei 
(6%). As a result of price manipulations Moldovan consumers are penalized for additional 
49,5 million lei just in 1996.
“Moldovagaz” 
increases its 
annual profit-
ability margin 
by 10 million US 
dollars at con-
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T H E  G A Z E  I N D U S T R Y  I N  R M :    T H E  B U R D E N  O F  I G N O R A N C E  A N D  T H E  C O S T  O F  E R R O R S
27
Decreasing the calculations basis (volume of 3.4. 
supplied gas)
Another method used for increasing the tariff was accepting by central authorities the 
decrease of calculation basis (the volume of supplied gas). As it has been mentioned before 
the tariff is being calculated for each 1000 cubic meters. It is divided then by expenses 
made for gas transportation and distribution, maintenance works, etc. to the total volume 
of gas which was consumed. According to the data Moldova consumed in 1996 3,15 billion 
of cubic meters of gas, out of which 1,8 billion cubic meters were consumed solely by the 
right territory to the Dnester. However in order to calculate the tariff based on the data from 
1996, the total amount of expenses encountered for gas distribution and transportation 
(94 million lei, which were also inflated) were divided to 1,2 billion cubic meters of gas, 
which resulted in another 20 lei increase of tariff (4%). In this regard we tend to mention 
that in 1999 “Gazprom” pays for the gas that transited across the territory of Moldova not by 
reducing the gas purchasing price but using additional gas supply volumes to transit across 
the territory. Knowing the strategy applied for manipulating with data for calculating the 
volumes of gas that were delivered to Moldova it is urgently necessary to verify whether 
this information appears on the balance sheet of “Moldovagaz” and were included in the 
tariff composition at each historical period. We presume it is not included on the balance 
sheet.
Including in the tariff penalties for late gas 3.5. 
consumption payments and interest rates for 
paying off credits necessary to return the debt to 
“Gazprom”
When calculating the gas tariffs there were additional calculations included regarding the 
penalties for late payments and credit interest rates. When calculating penalties at 0,02% 
for each day late payment “Gazprom” is charging 7,3% annual interest rate in US dollars for 
a credit to JSC “Moldovagaz”. Unfortunately there is no information regarding conditions at 
which this credit was taken, to evaluate the relations between “Gazprom” and “Moldovagaz” 
in this contract. 
However even if the penalty and interest rate sums are included in the tariff calculations, 
it stimulates a chain reaction of late payments because the penalties for late payments are 
distributed among all consumers. It means that those people pay in time their bills, transfer 
a part of accumulated debt by those who do not pay in time or do not pay at all. On one 
hand this stimulates bad tax payers to keep up with their practice and on the other hand this 
is being reflected into a financial pressure over loyal consumers. In macroeconomics there 
exists a law, according to which after a certain level the further increase of tax will diminish 
its collection. This rule is also available for natural gas tariffs  It is possible to assume how the 
tax collection could have changed if the bills were 15-20% lower.
As a conclusion by recalculating the tariff based on conditions stipulated in 1996 then out 
of 454 lei, if the corresponding calculation methodology would have been used, the tariff 
should be under 294 lei. If we take into account that the tariff was to increase proportionally 
with to the purchasing price of gas and exchange rate fluctuations (because the currency 
value in the contract with “Gazprom” is in dollars), then we can conclude that during 1995-
In its attempts 
to increase the 
profit “Moldova-
gaz” is applying 
data manipu-
lation. Public 
authorities ac-
cepted this ether 
because were 
not informed or 
having some ill-
intentions...
The current 
tariff structure 
stipulates that 
loyal consumers 
have to pay af-
ferent penalties 
for those who 
are late with 
payments or do 
not pay their bill 
at all...
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2006, by inflating the consumer tariff for population on the territory to the right of Dnester 
were forced to pay 3,6 billion of lei, which is equivalent to $370 million. Having in mind 
that since 1999 “Gazprom” holds a 50% share from “Moldovagaz”, around 1,4 billion lei or 
110 million US dollars  is the money of the Russian monopoly in the over profits that JSC. 
“Moldovagaz” encountered at expense of consumers from the right territory of the Dnester. 
Taking these premises into account today the tariff should be decreased by one third. 
These were only direct effects when compounding an inflated tariff for gas consumption. 
However there are indirect consequences whose effects are difficult to measure in value 
means, such as:
affecting the competitiveness of local producers both on the local and international 1. 
market;
aggravating the Transnistrian by indirect finance of the Tiraspol regime;2. 
decreasing the collection rate of payments for gas and the total volume of 3. 
accumulation
Environment pollution and deforestation, etc.4. 
During 1995-
2006, consumes 
were from the 
right bank of 
Dnester were 
forced to pay ad-
ditional 3,6 bil-
lion lei than the 
real gas price. 
Having a 50% 
share in „Mol-
dovagaz” „Gaz-
prom” obtained 
an additional 1,4 
billion lei or 110 
million dollars 
profit...
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ConCLuSionS And reCommendAtionS4. 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from this report are that the public policies 
that have been adopted at various historical stages by the administration of Republic of 
Moldova caused a total  prejudice to the country of at least $ 952,2 millions, including 
$111,7 additional profits which were collected by “Gazprom”. This money comes directly 
from consumers from the territory to the right of Dnester. Additionally consumers were 
forced to pay another $338,4 million which were used indirectly to finance the separatist 
regime from Tiraspol through:
By the end of 1994 and when the establishment of „Gazsnabtranzit” was coming to an 
end: 
Over $416 millions were obtained by selling at the price of $51,5peste  million a 	
patrimony whose real value is $468 millions;
$ 150 millions were obtained by inflating the debt to “Gazprom”.	
By the end of 1997 when JSC ”Moldovagaz” was established:
$ 76 million by inflating the debt to “Gazprom”;	
$95,5 millions by avoiding repaying additionally obtained patrimony;	
$70,1 millions obtained by inflating the tariff;	
Additional $ 107,36 millions as afferent debts of Transnistrian consumers. This 	
money was paid by consumers from the right territory to Dnester.
By the end of 2006 and by not including the newly built distribution system, in addition 
to what has been written above:
$103 millions were obtained from not adjusting the price for gas to the transit 	
price;
$240 millions were obtained from inflating the tariff;	
Additional $ 231 millions were paid by consumers from the territory to the right to 	
Dnester for debts that were afferent to consumers from the left bank.
The situation that was created in this strategic domain for economic growth of the 
country can be defined as catastrophic. In such conditions, central public authorities, 
the Parliament, Government and other public representatives have to summon a 
National Commission which will investigate the crimes that have been committed and 
establish a new framework of relations wit the Russian monopoly. The new framework 
will appear only if there will be serious political and economic intentions for protecting 
the independence and sovereignty of Republic of Moldova.  
The following priority steps should be taken by this commission, established by the 
government of Republic of Moldova:
Establishing a transparent framework over information regarding natural gas 	
consumption, transit and consumer tariff calculation. Annex 3 contains the list 
of documents and information needed to conduct a detailed analysis and not an 
estimative one. If this data is published in a short time frame this would be a proof of 
constructive dialogue and intention of “Moldovagaz” for having an open dialogue.
Installing an automatic control at the eastern border for tracking the volume of 	
supplied natural gas. Revising the procedures for data monitor at the moldo-
ukrainean border;
Creating a mixed inter-governmental group with the participation of the business 	
The total 
amount of preju-
dices caused as 
a result of public 
policies adopted 
in 1994-2006 are 
estimated at 1,5 
billion US dol-
lars...
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representatives and civic society in order to assess in a more professional and 
responsible way the situation described in this paper and offer solutions based on 
real and not estimative data;
Negotiating with “Gazprom” new price conditions for gas transit and consumption 	
equivalent to the ones in Ukraine; subscribing RM to the European Energy Carte, 
as a natural gas transit country, and appealing to legal services in case Moldova is 
being rejected by the Russian monopolist;
Reevaluating the property which is owned by the shareholders of “Moldovagaz” 	
including Transnistrian property and consumption reevaluation. This can be 
achieved by using all the legal and economic possible instruments; insisting on 
cancelling all previously signed agreements and returning to the situation from 
1993.
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Annexe:
Annex 1. The map of Republic of Moldova Central Gas Routes
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Annex 2. Estimating the value of the gas transportation business in Republic of Moldova 
as of 1994
The evaluation method is called discounting profit flow by calculating their present 
values.
In other words we will calculate the present (1994) value of future profits.
For applying this method we considered the following reference information:
Calculation Period(t) = 30 years	 . We considered this period because: 
The gas transit business is relatively stable because in 1994 the demand for energy 1. 
resources in Balkans was relatively stable having a tendency to increase in future. 
The only fluctuations were due to temperature variations during the heating 
season.
The risk for appearance of alternative technologies for obtaining cheaper energy 2. 
and their implementation in Balkans and entire Europe is reduced to zero.
The effective working period for gas pipes is between 30 and 100 years. We 3. 
considered the smaller number.
Discounting rate in the following periods (d) = 10% annually	 . We use this number 
because:
As it has been mentioned before the natural gas transportation business is a stable 1. 
one.
All the calculations and payments in this business are made using a convertible 2. 
currency which has a world circulation: US dollars. Therefore the business does not 
depend on fluctuations of national currency and the uncertainties that could have 
provoked it.
With all this the business is located in Republic of Moldova, the country with an 3. 
instable legislative, political system on whose territory there have been often 
conflicts.
Business profit in the first year (P) = 77 mln. $	 . This value is not equivalent to the one that 
was reported by enterprises which administered this system:
The price for transit in 1994, had to be adjusted proportionally to increase of gas 1. 
prices. It should have constituted 3,1169 dollars for 1000 m3 which transit the 
territory. In reality the price remained $1,5 in 1994 and was increased to only $2,66 
in 1995 (see section 2.5).
According to the data (see Annex 4) the average quantity of gas which transited 2. 
the territory of Moldova to the Balkans in 1995-1998 equaled to 25,5 billion cubic 
meters per year. In our calculations we assumed that the volume of gas which 
transited the territory was 24 billion of cubic meters of gas per year due to the 
following reasoning: (a) the data which was officially presented in 1994 was wrong 
(see section 2.3); and (b) gas consumption in 1994 could have been lower than this 
average due to the general increase of gas consumption trend in Balkans.
The entire amount of money which was obtained from transiting gas should be 3. 
considered profit, because all the afferent expenses to transit, including depreciation, 
network maintenance and gas consumed by the compression stations were 
included in the final tariff (see Chapter 3). As a result this money had to be paid off 
by consumers.
Average Annual rate of profit growth (r) = 4%	 , being made of:
Annual average rate of growth for gas prices, which is caused by the general trend 1. 
for energy resource price increase. This is especially true for non-recoverable energy 
resources.
Average Annual Gas consumption growth, which is caused by extension of natural 2. 
gas supply networks and switching from burning coal and oil to natural gas. This is 
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also caused by the industrial development in the Balkans and the entire Europe.
Therefore for each further period the following formula was applied when calculating the 
present value of profits:
n
n d
nrPVP
)
100
1(
)1(
+
−×+=
where n is alternating from 1 to t = 30. 
The sum of these values VP1, VP2, VP3, ... , VP29, VP30 equals to 
$ 935,75 millions or 3,995 billion moldovan lei
Using the 4,27 lei per 1 dollar exchange rate, as of 31.12.1994.
The same formula was applied when evaluating the gas selling business to Moldovan 
consumers except from::
Business profit (P) in the first year was estimated at 30 mln. $	 .
The discount rate of profits (d) was fixed at 24% per year 	 because in this case business is 
made in the entire country, which has an instable political and economic regime. We 
look here also at exchange rate risk because the payments to “Gazprom” were calculated 
in dollars, and the incomes in lei.
According to the formula, the estimative value of the gas selling business in Moldova equals 
to:
$ 145,37 millions or $ 668,69 million moldovan lei
notA Bene:
Due to a tight connection between the price for gas and transit price (which has to be 
adjust each time) the gas transit business value increases proportionally with to the 
price for gas. Therefore this value should have been adjusted at least in 2006 and 2007, 
when the price for gas supplied to Moldova went up.
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Annex 3. The list of documents and information which have to be made public by the JSC 
„Moldovagaz” administration
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Annex 4. Consolidated information regarding money settling with “Gazprom” for 
consumed gas (1994-1999)
The total volume of gas which transited Moldova in 1994-2006.1. 
„Moldovagaz”, “Moldovatransgaz”, “Gazsnabtranzit balance statements for 1994-2007.2. 
Profit and Loss accounts (Form 2) of the above mentioned economics agents for the 3. 
same period.
“Moldovagaz” income flow from consumers in 1994-2006.4. 
Moldo-Ukrainean negotiation meeting notes regarding gas loss repartition (1993-5. 
2006)
Detailed structure of tariffs calculated during 1994-20076. 
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Annex 5. “Gazprom” experts’ recommendations regarding the value of the ATI gas line 
and income repartition obtained from natural gas transit between the right and left 
territories to the Dnester (07.02.2000)
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Annex 6. “Moldovagaz” explanation regarding no including in its calculations the central 
gas routes and income repartition from gas transit (03.04.2001)
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Annex 7. Informative note of the department of finance from Ministry of Privatization 
and State Property Administration regarding violations committed when establishing 
„Gazsnabtranzit”
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 Annex 8. Decision of Government of Republic of Moldova nr. 302 from May 12, 1995 
regarding „Gazsnabtranzit” foundation, which was not published in Monitorul Oficial
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